Performance Characterization of Random Proximity Sensor Networks

In this paper, we characterize the localization performance and connectivity of sensors networks consisting of binary proximity sensors using a random sensor management strategy. The sensors are deployed uniformly at random over an area, and to limit the energy dissipation, each sensor node switches between an active and idle state according to random mechanisms regulated by a birth-and-death stochastic process. We first develop an upper bound for the minimum transmitting range which guarantees connectivity of the active nodes in the network with a desired probability. Then, we derive an analytical formula for predicting the mean-squared localization error of the active nodes when assuming a centroid localization scheme. Simulations are used to verify the theoretical claims for various localization schemes that operate only over connected active nodes

Probabilistic Logic Programming with Beta-Distributed Random Variables

We enable aProbLog---a probabilistic logical programming approach---to reason in presence of uncertain probabilities represented as Beta-distributed random variables. We achieve the same performance of state-of-the-art algorithms for highly specified and engineered domains, while simultaneously we maintain the flexibility offered by aProbLog in handling complex relational domains. Our motivation is that faithfully capturing the distribution of probabilities is necessary to compute an expected utility for effective decision making under uncertainty: unfortunately, these probability distributions can be highly uncertain due to sparse data. To understand and accurately manipulate such probability distributions we need a well-defined theoretical framework that is provided by the Beta distribution, which specifies a distribution of probabilities representing all the possible values of a probability when the exact value is unknown.Comment: Accepted for presentation at AAAI 201

Attack Detection in Sensor Network Target Localization Systems with Quantized Data

We consider a sensor network focused on target localization, where sensors measure the signal strength emitted from the target. Each measurement is quantized to one bit and sent to the fusion center. A general attack is considered at some sensors that attempts to cause the fusion center to produce an inaccurate estimation of the target location with a large mean-square-error. The attack is a combination of man-in-the-middle, hacking, and spoofing attacks that can effectively change both signals going into and coming out of the sensor nodes in a realistic manner. We show that the essential effect of attacks is to alter the estimated distance between the target and each attacked sensor to a different extent, giving rise to a geometric inconsistency among the attacked and unattacked sensors. Hence, with the help of two secure sensors, a class of detectors are proposed to detect the attacked sensors by scrutinizing the existence of the geometric inconsistency. We show that the false alarm and miss probabilities of the proposed detectors decrease exponentially as the number of measurement samples increases, which implies that for sufficiently large number of samples, the proposed detectors can identify the attacked and unattacked sensors with any required accuracy